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For researchers and students of International Relations (IR), one date looms larger than all others: 1648. The end of the Thirty Years War, formalised by the signing of the Treaties of Osnabrück and Münster, led to a period known as the ‘Peace of Westphalia.’ Westphalia represented a fundamental change in the power balance of European politics: instead of the Holy Roman Empire holding supreme authority, power would now rest with states themselves, manifested in terms of sovereignty, territory and equality. One of the chief ways in which these ‘Westphalian’ states would cement this authority was through the use of maps. Before 1648, there was little on a European map to indicate where one country ended and another one began. But after 1648, this all changes: these new Westphalian states are represented with bright colours and clearly marked boundaries, defining borders and becoming an important part in creating the state and justifying its sovereignty. The role which maps have played in the spread of the Westphalian state is only just beginning to be researched. Yet the limited efforts to date have all focussed on Europe. This is unfortunate, as today, while Europe has, according to some observers, moved into a stage in which Westphalia is no longer a useful model with which to understand the state and the ways in which it relates to sovereignty, government, power and the individual, the old Westphalian model of the state has more recently been exported all around the world. This paper presents the first part of a project which aims to look at this expansion. The European angle will be presented in this paper; future research will be carried out in China, Japan and Taiwan. 
Introduction
*** Figure 1 goes here*** 
Figure 1: CIA, 2012, Europe
Throughout the history of cartography, maps have been used to present numerous fictions as reality. This should not necessarily come as a surprise; Monmonier (1991: 1) aruges that ‘[n]ot only is it easy to lie with maps, it’s essential’ in his entertainingly titled How to Lie with Maps. Yet maps are perceived by many people to be unbiased truths (Neocleous 2003: 417–421). Indeed, Culcasi argues that ‘a map’s power relies on the myth that a map is an objective, scientific representation of reality’ (Culcasi 2006: 685). One such objective, scientific representation of reality is presented in Figure 1. This is the CIA’s ‘political’ map of Europe for 2012. Each state can be quickly identified thanks to the bright, solid colours and, as can be seen in the detail from the Franco-Spanish border in the lower part of the Figure, the black lines separating each state from its neighbours. Yet political maps have not always looked like this. 
The recently emerged field of critical cartography gives us the tools to look at maps and try to understand the power they have over our sense of place in the world. This is important: when historical maps are presented as evidence by states arguing over territorial sovereignty of islands or border regions, we can see the remarkable power that maps have (as Smith 2001:132 points out, maps have a ‘peculiar creative magic’; see also Smith 1995). Yet to date, no research has looked at the changing nature of maps at a key period in the history of International Relations – 1648 – and the effect that this has had on cartography, and by extension, international politics, today. 
1648: The year the world changed
For researchers and students of International Relations, one date looms larger than all others: 1648. The end of the Thirty Years War, formalised by the signing of the Treaties of Osnabrück and Münster, led to a period known as the ‘Peace of Westphalia.’ Westphalia represented a fundamental change in the power balance of European politics: instead of the Holy Roman Empire holding supreme authority, power would now rest with states themselves, manifested in terms of sovereignty, territory and equality. 
It is the argument of this paper that one of the chief ways in which these ‘Westphalian’ states would cement this newly-found authority was through the use of maps. Broadly, before Westphalia, there was little on a European map to indicate where one country ended and another one began. But after Westphalia, this begins to change: these new Westphalian states are represented with bright colours and clearly marked boundaries, defining borders and becoming an important part in creating the state and justifying its sovereignty. 
Much of the developing field of critical cartography has focussed to date on Europe. This is unfortunate, as today, while Europe has, according to some observers, moved into a ‘post-modern’ stage (see Cooper, 2003) in which, as a result of the European Union, the euro currency and the Schengen Agreement, Westphalia is no longer a useful model with which to understand the state and the ways in which it relates to sovereignty, government, power and the individual, the old Westphalian model of the state has more recently been exported all around the world. Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 2, the majority of the world can today be considered to be part of a ‘Westphalian state.’

*** Figure 2 goes here ***
Figure 2: The spread of Westphalia, produced as part of a separate GIS project. Pickering, 2012. 
Many have contended that while the Westphalian state is no longer relevant to Europe, it was never relevant to the rest of the world (see, for instance, Blake 2000). This paper will look at the ways in which a particular type of map has come to dominate the narrative. Such maps are usually referred to as ‘political maps,’ but as all maps are ‘political’ it perhaps makes more sense to refer to them as ‘Westphalian maps.’ The emphasis in this paper will be maps of Europe; these will establish the groundwork for future research which will look at the spread of Westphalian maps from Europe to Asia. 
Cave!  Hic dragones!  – Beware!  Here be dragons! 
*** Figure 3 goes here ***
Figure 3: The fearsome Pistrum or Phiset: detail from Olaus Magnus, 1572, Carta Marina
Black (1997) argues that the borders between states became increasingly important towards the end of the eighteenth century. It is worth quoting him at length: 
Many European ‘frontiers’ were, as in Spain after the dynastic union of Castile and Aragon (1479) or Britain after the union of Scotland and England (1603, 1707), essentially domestic-political, most commonly judicial and financial, rather than of any international significance... This mental world changed appreciably as the impetus that the French Revolution gave to nationalism from 1789 altered European political consciousness, but already, prior to that, the increasing demands of sovereign states helped to reconfigure power relationships within their boundaries, thus making the areas comprehended by state frontiers on maps more real as units.
– Black 1997: 130. 
The argument of this paper is that there is indeed much evidence to show that maps were changing to reflect these ‘increasing demands of sovereign states’ as far back as the seventeenth century, and that we see an acceleration of this process after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. 
Border types
In order to study the changing nature of maps before and after Westphalia, it has been necessary to look at hundreds of ‘political’ maps of Europe. In so doing, a typology emerges, through which we can see the evolution of the political map. Starting in 1568, this typology of maps and borders is presented below. 
No obvious border
The first type of European political map is one in which there are no obvious borders: there are no dotted/ dashed lines and there is no use of colour. Mountains and rivers, two types of traditional bona fide border, are presented, but they do not necessarily indicate the presence of a border. The map Europæ brevis by an unknown cartographer, presented in Figure 4 provides a good example. The Pyrenees are readily identifiable, but there is nothing to indicate that they constitute a border.  The words “Francia” and “Spagna” can be made out, but there is little to show where one ends and the other begins.  

*** Figure 4 goes here ***
Figure 4: Unknown cartographer, 1568, Europæ brevis: No obvious border
Dotted/ dashed border
Next, we have dashed or dotted borders. The 1611 map by Jodocus Hondius the elder, Nova Europæ, presented in Figure 5 serves as an example here. Again, country names can be found (“Gallia” and “Hispania”).  Also, the Pyrenees are once again evident, but this time, a line made of small black dots is drawn through the mountain range, indicating a border.  Notice how, again, there is no use of colour. This does not mean that a coloured version of this map does not exist; it means instead that the researcher has not found one. The colouring of maps was very much an ‘optional extra’ and it is apparent that many people chose not to pay for this extra service. Ceteris paribus, we would not expect the colouring of maps to change over time, yet as time progresses, maps become more colourful in several ways, as will be seen. 

*** Figure 5 goes here ***
Figure 5: Jodocus Hondius (the elder), 1611, Nova Europæ: Dashed border
Two colour border
As was shown at the beginning of this paper, international boundaries are presented on CIA maps in black. In a sense, this black line can be imagined as occupying a thin strip of no-man’s land; neither belonging to state A or state B. In a sense, it is hardly surprising that the CIA chooses to represent borders in this way: this is indeed a very good representation of the border between the United States and Canada. The black line takes on a very real sense in this boundary: the actual border between the US and Canada is maintained by a separate body called the International Boundary Commission which is responsible for maintaining the integrity of this boundary. One of the ways in which it does this is by chopping down all the trees when they come within three metres of either side of the boundary. 
But the ‘no-man’s land’ is not the only, and nor is it the oldest, way of presenting a map on a page. The next step in the evolution of the European political map is the two-colour border. Figure 6 presents such a map, and in the detail, we can see the border between France and Spain: France’s border is pink, while Spain’s border is green. The pink line indicates ‘this is where France ends’ while the green line would suggest ‘and here is where Spain begins.’  The Pyrenees are again a clear part of the engraving, but interestingly, there is no dotted border; only the watercolours indicate the border (or borders: one where state A ends, and another where state B begins).  

*** Figure 6 goes here *** 
Figure 6: Unknown cartographer, 1630, Europa: Two-colour border
Two colour border and solid colour states
The next big evolution in the European political map is the use of solid colour. Sanson’s 1651 map, just three years after Westphalia, gives a good example (see Figure 7). As has been said, the use of colour in European maps is certainly not new in the seventeenth century. What is new, however, is the use of different, solid colours to represent the states, with two colour borders to show the boundaries (Figure 7 also uses dotted borders, although in this case, they are not exclusively for states; they are also used for smaller administrative units). Here, the use of colour is suggesting that the states have uniform sovereignty or control over a defined territory. This is an important precedent for future “Westphalian maps,” even when the territories they are presenting may not really be “Westphalian states.”  

*** Figure 7 goes here ***
Figure 7: Nicolas Sanson, 1651, L’Europe: Two-colour border and solid-coloured states
Tricks of the cartographic trade
As has already been mentioned, while the cartographers themselves tend to be very careful in creating their map engravings, the water-colour artists are less so. For various legal and political reasons, the CIA often writes the words ‘boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative’ on its maps, and this is certainly true in Figure 8. The two details are taken from an identical engraving, but have been watercoloured separately. The detail on the left determines that Lusace was a part of Bohemia in 1700, while the detail on the right excludes it, and also paints a redundant line on a Bohemian-Moravian mountain range. 
*** Figure 8 goes here ***
Figure 8: Guillaume Delisle, 1700, L’Europe: Same engraving, different water-colour borders
But a more obvious case of slapdash water-colour borders can be seen in the detail from an unknown sixteenth century map presented in Figure 9. Here we see that the sea-facing boundary of Spain has been painted in a very haphazard way, at certain points not even touching the land in Spain. 
*** Figure 9 goes here *** 
Figure 9: Unknown cartographer, c. 16th century, map of Roman Catholic states
Findings: Europe
Now that the different types of border representation have been introduced, it is possible to present findings on the distribution of border types across time (see Table 1). As can be seen, the frequency of two-colour borders and solid state colour increases after Westphalia (1648). This is important. Maps can be a reflection of beliefs; maps can also influence decisions.  The “political” maps we are used to seeing today always use solid colours to give a clear impression of which state has sovereignty over which territory, and to make it clear that there is no confusion of this sovereignty.  Also, it gives the impression that state sovereignty is uniform: by using solid colours, maps suggest that the power of the state runs equally throughout the state's territory.  The use of maps, whether intentional or otherwise, to convey this idea can be dated back to Westphalia.  
Future research: China, Japan and Taiwan
This paper serves as a foundation on which to research maps in Asia. When did Asian maps start following European border standards?  Are Westphalian borders appropriate within an Asian context?  To answer these questions, maps will be studied in China, Japan and Taiwan. 
Conclusion
The importance of borderlines drawn on maps cannot be understated. A rather sinister example of this can be found in the chilling words Ratko Mladić, currently on trial at the Hague for crimes against humanity and genocide, who said that ‘borders are always drawn in blood.’ Fundamentally, we need to ask why lines are drawn on the page in the way they are. Blake (2000: 10) argued that ‘[i]f regions beyond the reach of central government could be plotted on a world map they would provide graphic evidence that the old state system is diseased.’ The remit of governments has always varied across territories and time. It has been the argument of this paper that, while it could indeed be possible to plot the kind of map Blake is looking for, over three-and-a-half centuries of map development have moved in a different direction, not for any reason specific to the needs of cartography, but because there has been a political incentive to do so. This paper ends with three alternative means of presenting border regions in cartography. 
States fading away
*** Figure 10 goes here ***
Figure 10: Marcus, 1994, Ethiopia, 1270–1524
The first, presented in Figure 10 is taken from Marcus (1994). Entitled ‘Ethiopia, 1270–1524’ it represents a region defined as the medieval Ethiopian state. Yet rather than abruptly ending, it simply fades away. This seems a more useful way of representing the regions referred to by Blake as ‘beyond the reach of central government.’ 
Carta Marina and watercolours
*** Figure 11 goes here *** 
Figure 11: Olaus Magnus, 1572, Carta Marina
On the Carta Marina (1572, Figure 11), there is nothing in the engraving of the map to indicate state borders; this is all done through the watercolour painting. The Carta Marina is arguably one of the most beautiful maps in existence, but it is also one of the most interesting. The detail shown in the lower part of the Figure presents Carelia: one of the points at which Finland meets Russia. The water-colour artist has represented the two states with two different colours: yellow and blue-green. Yet in painting the border region, the artist did not let the watercolours dry, so the two have bled into each other at the bordering area, creating a green region. In a sense, this seems another useful way of representing border regions on maps
Schengen
*** Figure 12 goes here ***
Figure 12: CIA map revisited: Schengenland
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